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Abstract 
Forensic analysis commonly involves searching an investigation target for personal identifiable information. An 
Inland Revenue Department (IRD) number is used for taxation purposes in New Zealand and can provide 
evidence of perpetrator identity, transaction information or electronic fraud. This research has designed and 
implemented a bulk_extractor feature scanner to detect and validate IRD numbers (features). The IRD scanner 
has been tested on a known data set to ensure tool functionality. A large real world data set was then used to 
determine scanner effectiveness in a realistic investigation scenario. Real world data set testing highlighted a 
high number of unrelated features detected by the scanner. To combat this, a novel post-processing technique 
was implemented to identify forensically interesting IRD numbers by performing feature context searching. The 
post-processing findings proved that feature context searching is an effective data reduction technique that 
identified a low number of directly relevant IRD numbers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The size of digital investigation targets continues to grow at an exponential rate due to increased digital storage 
capacity and the number of devices seized per case (Quick & Choo, 2014). Furthermore, the complexity of digital 
investigations is also escalating caused by the proliferation of operating systems and file formats (Garfinkel, 
2010). As a consequence, advanced forensic analysis techniques are required to combat these digital investigation 
challenges. 
A common forensic analysis task is to search digital media for Personally Identifiable Information (PII). The 
United States (U.S.) Government Accountability Office (GAO) defines PII as any personal information that can 
be used to locate, link or identify an individual (GAO, 2008). Examples include names, aliases, Social Security 
Number, passport number, driver’s license number, taxpayer identification number, credit card number and email 
addresses (McCallister, Grance and Scarfone, 2010). 
A person’s taxpayer identification number is an important personal identifier which is used for general tax 
purposes. The identification of taxpayer information is useful in digital investigations to determine perpetrator 
identification, attribution of financial information or potential electronic fraud. In New Zealand, taxpayer 
identification is controlled by the Inland Revenue Department (IRD) in the form of an IRD number: a unique 8 or 
9 digit number. An IRD number is also used for Goods and Services Tax (GST), a tax implemented on most 
products sold and/or services rendered in New Zealand. Australia has a similar tax number system where each 
person has a Tax File Number (TFN) issued by the Australian Taxation Office (ATO), while the U.S. equivalent 
is the Social Security Number (SSN).  
Previous Research 
Forensic analysis commonly involves performing text-based string searching to identify PII. Digital forensic 
string searching analyses each byte of digital evidence, at the physical level, to locate specific text strings of 
interest to an investigation (Beebe & Clark, 2007). Take the case of an electronic fraud investigation; potentially 
interesting searches may include credit card numbers, bank account numbers and tax identification numbers. 
Research projects in the past have investigated, designed and evaluated a variety of forensic analysis techniques 
and tools to retrieve such information. 
“An examiner can use the UNIX utilities strings and grep to perform keyword searches … strings will 
print the human-readable ASCII text it finds in a given input file, and grep will search through an input file or 
stream for a string matching a user-supplied regular expression or string” (Altheide, 2004). The Sleuth Kit (TSK) 
includes the Windows compatible srch_strings program, a modified version of the strings command 
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found in the GNU binutils package (Altheide & Carvey, 2011). The Identity Finder tool from Cornell 
University has the ability to scan hard drives, web sites and collections of files to identify social security, credit 
card and bank account numbers (Cornell University, 2014). Popular forensic tool kits have built-in functionality 
to identify common PII artifacts. EnCase Forensic has built-in functionality to search for credit card numbers, 
phone numbers, email addresses and social security numbers (Guidance Software, 2011).  
Garfinkel (2006) authored a program that scans media for credit card numbers (with different delimiters) and 
validates the output with the Luhn algorithm and a variety of other validation checks; for example, no major 
credit card number begins with the number eight. This was achieved by developing a variety of feature extractors 
to extract potentially interesting information including SSNs, email information and credit card numbers. 
Garfinkel (2013) continued this development resulting in the bulk_extractor tool; a stream forensic tool that 
reads the entire target media from start to end without performing disk seeking. The bulk_extractor tool 
contains a wide variety of feature extractors, or scanners, which search and extract a variety of PII information 
such as credit card numbers, telephone numbers and email addresses. 
The dilemma is that the discussed techniques and tools have limited usefulness as the resultant search hits are 
only identified based on the structure of the string being searched. A credit card number, for example, is usually 
stored in the following structure; NNNN-NNNN-NNNN-NNNN, four octets of four numbers. However, not all 
number combinations in this structure may be a valid credit card number. Thus, PII numbers usually have 
validation algorithms that can verify a value, such as the Luhn algorithm (Garfinkel, 2006). 
Research Problem  
Previous research surrounding forensic analysis of PII has primarily been designed for U.S. based information. 
There exists a need for verified techniques and tools to detect and validate PII from other countries. In New 
Zealand, IRD numbers can aid digital investigations involving financial information and attribution. Currently, 
there are no viable solutions available to detect and validate IRD numbers. This leads to practitioners having to 
develop their own tools that lack testing and verification. Implementation of techniques and tools must 
demonstrate design and evaluation to ensure that the resultant system produces reliable and credible results to aid 
forensic analysis. 
Paper Structure  
The aim of this paper is to present the design and implementation of a bulk_extractor scanner plug-in to 
detect and validate IRD numbers and a stoplist to filter irrelevant results. Experimental testing is conducted on a 
known data set to determine the functionality and capability of the implemented design. A selection of real world 
data sets are included in experimental testing to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the system design 
using realistic investigation examples. Finally, a conclusion is presented and future research areas are suggested. 
IRD SCANNER DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
A new bulk_extractor scanner plug-in was developed to perform automated detection and validation of 
IRD numbers. This section outlines the development of an IRD number scanner, the output format of the IRD 
scanner and the creation of a stoplist to remove false positive results present in default operating system 
installations. 
IRD Scanner Plug-in Development 
The bulk_extractor tool was selected as the platform to aid tool development for the following reasons: 
 Designed specifically for digital forensic analysis 
 Supports a plug-in architecture to provide ease of software development 
 Provides optimistic decompression of compressed data 
 Open source software provides the ability to freely use, modify and redistribute 
An IRD feature scanner plug-in (scan_ird.flex) was authored for bulk_extractor (version 1.4.0 
revision 10884) using GNU Fast LEXical analyser (FLEX) programming language; a tool to generate C++ 
programs to perform complex textual search patterns. The IRD scanner has two main functions: 1) Extract 
characters from the bulk_extractor stream buffer; and 2) Validate the extracted number. Similar to U.S. 
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SSNs, IRD numbers do not have a standardised structure and may be encountered in a variety of patterns. Table 
1 displays an overview of potential IRD number structures. 
 
IRD Number Description IRD Number Structure Example 
8 digits NNNNNNNN 12345678 
9 digits NNNNNNNNN 123456789 
8 digits with space delimiter NN NNN NNN 12 345 678 
8 digits with dash delimiter NN-NNN-NNN 12-345-678 
9 digits with space delimiter NNN NNN NNN 123 465 789 
9 digits with dash delimiter NNN-NNN-NNN 123-456-789 
Table 1: Overview of possible IRD number structures with examples (Inland Revenue, 2015). 
The IRD scanner was designed and implemented to include the six potential IRD number structures displayed in 
Table 1. To perform automated detection of potentially valid IRD numbers, six FLEX search patterns were 
authored. Figure 1 displays an example of one IRD number scanner rule to detect an 8 digit number separated 
with a dash delimiter.  
DELIM  ([-]) 
START8  [0-9]{2} 
BLOCK   [0-9]{3} 
 
[^0-9]{START8}{DELIM}{BLOCK}{DELIM}{BLOCK} { 
 /* Number structure: NN-NNN-NNN */ 
 /* IRD scanner processing code goes here */ 
} 
Figure 1: Example of a FLEX scanner rule to detect a potential IRD number. 
As stated earlier, credit card numbers can be validated using the Luhn algorithm, also known as the modulus 10 
algorithm. IRD numbers have a very similar validation model which uses the modulus 11 algorithm (Inland 
Revenue, 2015). Furthermore, an IRD number must be within the following range: 10,000,000 and 150,000,000. 
This results in 140 million possible numbers of which approximately only 13.8 million are valid. Using the 
validation algorithm, an 8 or 9 digit number can be processed, validated and included in scanner results. Any 8 
or 9 digit number that does not validate is discarded. Figure 2 displays an overview of the IRD number 
validation process implemented in the scanner plug-in. 
Potential IRD number
Is the number 
between 10million 
and 150million?
Remove last digit 
from potential IRD 
number
Perform modulus 11 
algorithm
Valid IRD numberInvalid IRD number
Yes
Yes
No
No
Is the remainder the 
same as the last digit?
 
Figure 2: Overview of IRD number validation technique (Inland Revenue, 2015). 
IRD Scanner Plug-in Output 
Once the target data set has been processed the bulk_extractor tool produces three different output files for 
the IRD scanner: 1) A feature file; 2) A histogram file; and 3) A stoplist feature file. According to Bradley & 
Garfinkel (2015) the feature file is a tab-delimited text file that contains the offset where the feature was found, 
the feature itself (in this case the IRD number) and a configurable number of bytes that precede and follow the 
feature (referred to as the feature context). Figure 3 displays a snippet of a populated IRD feature file. 
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Figure 3: Example of a feature file output from the IRD scanner. 
A stoplist feature file is presented in the same format and is populated with IRD numbers that have been deemed 
irrelevant as they appear in the specified stoplist. Documentation of excluded features is an important function to 
have later access to if required. 
Stoplist Implementation 
Baier & Breitinger (2011) state that blacklists are a document or database that contain known content which are 
used to filter irrelevant results. For example, a blacklist may contain a collection of known illicit material that is 
represented by file names and cryptographic hash values. A bulk_extractor stoplist operates on a very 
similar principle. The bulk_extractor tool implements a novel blacklisting technique called context-
sensitive stoplists which only filter a feature if it appears in exactly the same context of a known operating 
system file (Garfinkel, 2013).  Stoplists are important as they perform data reduction, therefore, decreasing the 
amount of information that requires further analysis. 
A stoplist was generated by performing a fresh default installation of various Microsoft Windows operating 
systems in a Virtual Machine (VM) testing environment. Multiple VMs were created using a variety of operating 
systems installed with default options. The VM disk was forensically imaged using FTK Imager and then 
processed using the IRD scanner. This resulted in a feature file of known IRD numbers for each default 
operating system install. All feature files were processed and the feature (IRD number) and feature context 
extracted and then populated in a master stoplist (ird_stoplist.txt). The stoplist can be included when 
running bulk_extractor by specifying the -w argument and the stoplist file name. The following Windows 
operating systems were selected for stoplist generation (all systems were 32-bit unless stated): 
 MSDOS622 
 Windows 3.1 
 Windows 95 
 Windows 98 
 Windows ME 
 Windows 2000 
 Windows NT 4.0 
 Windows XP (32 bit) 
 Windows XP (64 bit) 
 Windows Server 2003 
 Windows Vista 
 Windows 7 (32 bit) 
 Windows 7 (64 bit) 
 Windows 8 
 Windows 8.1 
 Windows 10 
Post-processing IRD Scanner Output 
Post-processing involves performing additional forensic analysis of the IRD scanner output. The 
bulk_extractor tool implements stream-based forensic analysis and therefore, provides no information 
regarding file system content. A framework was developed to perform a variety of post-processing tasks to help 
identify data files that contain validated and forensically interesting IRD numbers. The implemented framework 
is comprised of the following phases: 
 Determine the data file associated with each detected and validated feature 
 For each feature, search the feature context using keywords 
 Extract files that contain search hits 
Determining the data files associated with the identified IRD numbers was achieved by processing the IRD 
feature file using the identify_filenames.py script. This process produces an annotated feature file 
which appends the logical file system location for each feature. A post-processing script 
(ird_search_context.py) was authored to parse and search the annotated feature file. Each feature 
context was extracted and a keyword search performed to identify potentially interesting IRD numbers. The 
following keywords were used: 1) IRD; and 2) GST. The 'GST' keyword was included because a company’s IRD 
# BULK_EXTRACTOR-Version: 1.4.0 ($Rev: 10844 $) 
# Feature-Recorder: ird 
# Filename: /media/forensic/HDD/WindowsTestHDD.001 
# Feature-File-Version: 1.1 
107594013 112233445 plugininstaller_1122334455667788_6.1.7600 
107598558 80-137-249 llageGST Reg No:80-137-2494B Titoki Place 
107598608 76264279 id: {l:16 b:a04b76264279d00118000000cc02 
107618283 22-220-616 N<BR>IRD no.<BR>22-220-616 <BR>Tax Code \x0D\x0A 
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number is the same as that used for GST purposes. For each feature with a matching keyword, the feature was 
extracted for an investigator to perform manual analysis. 
KNOWN DATA SET TESTING 
The first data set used for experimental testing was an authored realistic computer system with known content. 
The data set was populated with a variety of common file types populated with known valid IRD numbers. This 
section discusses the data set generation method and results obtained. 
Data Set Generation  
The creation of a known data set was accomplished by implementing a Virtual Machine (VM) testing 
environment using the VirtualBox software. The VM was installed with Microsoft Windows 7 32-bit using 
default installation options. VirtualBox Guest Additions were installed and a shared folder was created to 
copy data to the guest system. A forensic image of the VM was collected using FTK Imager and then used to 
create an IRD stoplist using the IRD scanner and implementing the resultant feature file as a stoplist. 
A collection of common document formats (DOC, DOCX, XLS, XLSX, RTF and PDF) were authored using a 
variety of Microsoft Office versions on Windows and Apple OS X. A selection of text encodings and PDF 
printing methods were implemented to ensure scanner effectiveness. A collection of folders and archive files 
were also created. This resulted in a total of 24 files. Each file created had a valid IRD number inserted to 
provide ground truth data. The known data was copied to the VM by using the shared folder functionality. To 
ensure the data files were copied correctly a Message Digest version 5 (MD5) hash value was calculated before 
and after transfer. The final stage in data set generation was to create a forensic image of the VM using FTK 
Imager.  
Known Data Set Results 
The known data set was processed using the IRD scanner, firstly without the stoplist and then together with the 
stoplist. The known data set was also processed using the strings and grep utilities, at first without any 
validation and then with IRD number validation. Table 2 displays an overview of results from known data set 
testing for the four different forensic analysis approaches. 
IRD Number 
Extraction Method 
Total Found Total Stopped Percentage 
Stopped 
Strings and grep 
with no validation 
290,772 N/A N/A 
IRD Scanner 21,616 0 0% 
Strings and grep 
with validation 
10,904 N/A N/A 
IRD Scanner with 
blacklist 
62 21,554 99.71% 
Table 2: IRD Scanner VS Strings and Grep: Overview of IRD number structures found in the known data set. 
A very high number of potential IRD numbers were found by strings and grep (approximately 300,000) as 
this method did not perform IRD number validation. In comparison, the IRD scanner without a stoplist 
discovered approximately 21,000 validated IRD numbers.  This result demonstrates the effectiveness of IRD 
number validation. Testing with strings and grep including IRD number validation detected approximately 
11,000 validated IRD numbers. This was lower than the IRD scanner (with validation) due to the capability of 
the bulk_extractor tool to decompress data during processing, thus, resulting in more search hits. The 
strings and grep tools cannot perform any decompression. Finally, the IRD scanner with a stoplist proved 
the most effective technique which discovered a total of 62 validated IRD numbers. The stoplist proved very 
effective by removing 99.71% of potential IRD numbers. These IRD numbers were filtered as they are known to 
reside in operating system files from a default installation. Of the 62 identified numbers, 24 were true positives 
from the known data set. The remainder (38 IRD numbers) were manually classified as false positives. In 
summary, the results from the IRD scanner with an authored stoplist proved effective at identifying the correct 
IRD numbers from the known data set while dramatically reducing false positive matches. 
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REAL WORLD DATA SET TESTING 
Real world data testing involved evaluating the IRD scanner on a variety of hard drives purchased on the second-
hand market. This section presents an overview of the real world data set, experimental testing results using the 
authored IRD scanner and findings achieved by performing post-processing of scanner output. 
Data Set Overview  
Real world data set testing for computer forensic tool development and testing is advantageous due to data 
diversity and unpredictability, thereby, providing more robust research findings (Garfinkel et al., 2009). The real 
world data set used for this testing was from second-hand hard drives primarily sourced from the New Zealand 
TradeMe auction website. This provided a useful testing data set as the hard drives would most likely have NZ 
IRD numbers. A total of 77 hard drives were sourced from Roberts (2013) and an additional 75 were purchased 
for this research. Attempts were made to forensically image all of the 152 hard drives. However, only 122 were 
able to be read, resulting in a total of 122 forensic images applicable for real world data set testing.  
Real World Data Set Results 
The total of 122 forensic images were processed using the bulk_extractor tool and specifying the IRD 
scanner plug-in. Processing revealed that only 92 of the forensic images had data, the remainder (30 forensic 
images) had previously been sanitised (overwritten with zeroes). The 92 forensic images equated approximately 
3.29 Terabytes of raw data. Table 3 displays a total count of the detected features (IRD numbers), a total count of 
features filtering using the stoplist and the percentage of stopped features. 
IRD Number Description Total Features Relevant Features Stopped Features Percentage Stopped 
8 digits 8,625,477 8,315,957 309,520 3.59% 
9 digits 7,590,536 6,663,180 927,356 12.22% 
8 digits with dash delimiter 148,032 148,012 20 0.01% 
8 digits with space delimiter 242,043 238,882 3,161 1.31% 
9 digits with dash delimiter 4,687 2,359 2,328 49.67% 
9 digits with space delimiter 83,090 82,651 439 0.53% 
Total 16,693,865 15,451,041 1,242,824 7.44% 
Table 3: Overview of IRD number structures found in the real world data set. 
The results obtained from real world testing illustrate the variability of tool performance on real data. Even with 
a master stoplist comprised of 16 default operating system installations there was an overwhelming number of 
detected and validated IRD numbers; a total of approximately 17 million. This is a formidable number of search 
hits for a practitioner to manually analyse. Approximately 1 million IRD numbers were filtered using the 
stoplist, this being approximately 7% of all detected features. However, the stoplist did prove more effective on a 
small number of hard drives, filtering over 60% of all detected IRD numbers on six different hard drives. Further 
processing is essential to identify IRD numbers of interest and to reduce manual analysis. 
Post-processing was thus performed on the results from the IRD scanner in an attempt to identify true positive 
IRD numbers of forensic interest. The post-processing framework was executed on each forensic image, 
specifically the feature file output (see Figure 3 for an example). The feature context, the data immediately 
surrounding the detected IRD number (default of 16 bytes either side), was searched using ‘IRD’ and ‘GST’ as 
keywords. The technique processes previously detected and validated IRD numbers and attempts to find IRD 
numbers with a recognisable prefix (e.g., IRD Number: NNN-NNN-NNN). Post-processing resulted in a 
dramatic reduction in IRD numbers deemed to be relevant.  Table 4 displays a summary of search hits found. It 
includes the total number of keyword hits and whether the IRD number was found in an allocated file or 
unallocated space. 
Search Term Keyword Hit Allocated File Unallocated File 
IRD 172 37 135 
GST 5,528 755 4,773 
Total 5,700 792 4,908 
Table 4: Overview of feature context search results from the real world data set. 
The post-processing keyword search proved effective in identifying IRD numbers of potential interest. A total of 
5,700 IRD numbers were identified. Of these, a total of 792 allocated files were identified and extracted 
including: Microsoft Word and Excel documents, PDF files, Lotus Notes database files, CSV files, Outlook 
Express files and Exchange Server EDB files. The post-processing searching technique found IRD numbers 
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stored in all six specified number structures (see Table 1).  An important finding was that a wide variety of IRD 
number prefixes were discovered, as illustrated in the following examples identified from testing output: 
 IRD 
 IRD No 
 IRD No is 
 GST 
 GST Number 
 GST No 
 GST# 
 GST REG No 
The prefix examples above were also found in a variety of conventions including: all upper-case, all lower-case, 
sentence case, with or without colons and a variety of spacing between the keyword and actual IRD number. The 
variety of prefix conventions make incorporating potential IRD number prefixes into the scanner exceptionally 
difficult. However, this highlights the effectiveness and flexibility of performing keyword searching on 
previously validated IRD numbers using feature context searching. 
CONCLUSION 
This research has contributed to the forensic analysis techniques used to detect and validate IRD numbers. A 
system was designed and implemented by authoring a scanner plug-in for the bulk_extractor tool. The 
IRD scanner was evaluated against known content and real world data sets to determine effectiveness. A novel 
post-processing search technique was implemented by searching the IRD number context (data before and after 
the detected and validated IRD number) which proved effective at performing data reduction of irrelevant 
results, reporting only forensically interesting results to the investigator. 
Forensic analysis and detection of PII remains an active research area. Additional research and testing to detect 
and validate other important personal information such as bank account numbers, driver’s license numbers, 
passport numbers and telephone numbers would prove useful to digital forensic practitioners in countries where 
techniques and tools are limited and not verified. 
Resource Availability 
To aid future research and development the IRD scanner plug-in, the master stoplist and post-processing 
framework have been made available and hosted on the authors GitHub repository: https://github.com/geehe732 
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